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NOTE ON THE TIME PATTERN
ALTHOUGH this volume is primarily concerned with trends, periodic
fluctuations in construction cannot be disregarded as might be the
shorter oscillations characteristic of other sectors of the economy. The
period from 1890 to 1950 was characterized by long swings in resi-
dential construction of thirteen to twenty-five years duration. If another
long swing is in the offing, the period to 1975 might be encompassed
by one long cycle.
Past economic fluctuations, wars, and their aftermaths shape in large
measure the future time pattern of residential construction. They in-
fluence changes in rates of population growth, the age composition of
the population, marriage rates, and household formation. Wartime
building restrictions generate postwar building booms to make up for
the accumulated deficit as well as to meet current additions to housing
demand. When the deficit is removed the volume of building is again
controlled by current demand. The influence of these factors can be
examined with reasonable assurance, as compared with other forces
operating on the movement of private residential construction, such
as national income and the soundness of the price and mortgage struc-
ture of existing residential real estate.
For this discussion of the future time pattern of residential construc-
tion it is unnecessary to assume that the swings observed during at least
the past sixty years or so have been self-generating cycles and that the
cyclical behavior exhibited in the past must be projected into the
future. Two of the three long cycles examined in Chapter III have
been associated with wars, and these two have shown much greater
amplitude of fluctuations than the first. A great deal of additional
research would be needed to assign the characteristics of these cycles
to the effects of war, to the coincidence of long swings in residential
construction and long swings in the secular growth of the economy
after World War I, and perhaps to inherent characteristics of resi-
dential real estate and its production and market behavior. Such
research is beyond the scope of this monograph. Even when these
questions are waived it is possible and fruitful to examine the pos-
sible effects of past events on the future movement of residential
construction.
At the beginning of 1954 and probably earlier, the war-induced back-
log of effective demand for new residential construction had been
largely met. While there is no unique measure of backlog demand,
the number and ratio of doubled-up families is a fair expression of the304 NOTEONTIMEPATI'ERN
forceof this demand. According to the Census Bureau, there were
fewer doubled-up families in April 1953 than in 1940: 1,546,000 com-
pared with 1,946,000. The number of such families in 1953 was little
more than half the postwar peak of 2,861,000 in 1947 and had declined
by almost 500,000 between 1950 and 1953. The ratio of married couples
living with relatives or others at the latest date was little over 4 per
cent against nearly 9 per cent in 1947, about 7 per cent in 1940, and
6 per cent in 1930.' In other words, the ratio was even lower than in
April 1930, when the use of housing facilities by consumers still
reflected prosperity conditions and high vacancy ratios assured a wide
choice of accommodations.
While the rate of doubling up is determined largely by economic
conditions, there is a rock bottom level of doubled-up families which,
for reasons of convenience, live with others. To judge from all available
historical data, this level was approached in 1953. Consequently, not
much demand for housing can be expected from this source. Even the
undoubling of individuals seems to have progressed at a rapid rate.
From 1950 to 1953 the number of "primary" individuals having their
own household increased by about 1.3 million or over 26 per cent,
while the number of husband-wife families with their own household
rose little more than 4 per cent.2 The increase in the number of dwell-
ing units occupied by individuals reflects the movement of single
adults from other household combinations as well as other factors
such as death and divorce.
Another factor partly related to past wars and previous economic
fluctuation is the prospective formation of households. Changes in
birth rates have an "echo" effect on marriage rates twenty to thirty
years later. The number of marriages in the next five to eight years will
reflect the relatively low birth rate of the thirties, and the number of
marriages in subsequent years will reflect the relatively high birth
rate of the forties. The number of children less than 15 years of age
was 36 million in 1930 and 33 million in 1940, but the comparable
number in 1950 was 41 million. These changes are bound to influence
the volume of residential construction ten to twenty years after these
dates, although the formation of "biological families," as was pointed
out earlier in this volume, is not the only factor determining increases
in the number of households.
1CurrentPopulation Reports, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 53.
2 Ibid.
3Birthsper 1,000 population ranged between 21.0 and 23.7 in 1920-1924,
between 16.6 and 18.9 in 1930-1935, and between 23.3 and 25.8 in 1948-1950.
Historical Statistics, Bureau of the Census, 1949, p. 46, and Statistical Abstract of
the United States, Bureau of the Census, 1952, p. 59.
4StatisticalAbstract of the United States, 1952, Table 18.NOTE ON TIME PATTERN 305
It thus appears that the first few years of the remaining period to
1975 will be characterized by low population pressure on residential
construction compared with the later years, when the rich baby crop
of the postwar years will reach marriage age. Barring a war of major
dimensions, it would require economic forces of spectacular impact—
such as prevalence of full employment during the next ten years and a
severe, prolonged depression during the subsequent period—to com-
pensate for the effects of past population changes on the time pattern
of new housing construction. Since these effects are pervasive and by
no means limited to residential construction, it would be unreasonable
to expect changes in economic conditions to perform such a com-
pensatory function.
During the next few years, expansion in certain types of nonresiden-
tial construction may tend to offset declines in residential building
occasioned through the operation of population forces. Fluctuations of
nonresidential construction in the past have not coincided with those
in residential activity.5 While some types of private nonresidential
building, such as shopping and institutional facilities, are in a large
measure dependent upon the volume of residential activity or respond
directly to consumer demand, others are more investment- than con-
sumer-oriented. And the volume of public building is determined by
manyfactors other than the quantity of residential construction.
Finally, the application of government aids will influence the future
time pattern of residential construction. The potential importance of
this influence is obvious from the scope of government programs
discussed previously, including public housing and urban redevelop-
ment as well as credit aids to privately financed residential construction.
The question is whether government activities can and will be used to
minimize or reduce the degree of fluctuations that may result from the
free operation of market forces. It can be—and has been—reasoned
that, when government programs in residential construction operate
over so large a part of the market, they may be used for just that
purpose. Aids would be intensified during periods of contraction and
diminished or withdrawn during periods of expansion and high levels
of building activity.6 It is instructive to examine the record of experi-
Miles L. Colean and Robinson Newcomb, Stabilizing Construction, McGraw-
Hill, 1952, pp. 45-50.
6 See Leo Crebler, '4Housing Policy and the Building Cycle," Review of Economic
Statistics, May 1942, PP. 68-74. The desirability of using the federal instru-
mentalities for mitigating fluctuations in the volume of residential construction is
not accepted generally. There is some feeling that housing aids should be used
continuously to advance housing standards, and that government policies directed
at greater economic stability should operate through other sectors of the economy
br through general fiscal and monetary measures.306 NOTEONTIME PATTERN
ence in the timing of government aids to date—a record covering
twenty years.
A review of this record allows only qualified optimism about the
application of federal credit aids in such manner as to mitigate
severe fluctuations. The policy of expansion of federal credit aids
and liberalization of credit terms, inaugurated during the late thirties
in a period of low construction, volume and low prices and rents
for existing residential real estate, was continued and intensffied
during the postwar years, when pressures on all resources and particu-
larly construction resources were great and prices rising or high. "There
has been little recognition in federal policy of the fundamental dif-
ference in the effects of liberal credit during periods of substantial
underutilization of resources and during periods of full employment
or overemployment of resources. During the thirties, of course, it was
possible through liberal credit to stimulate the demand for housing
without substantial rise in the cost of, and the price for, new dwellings.
The large unused resources for construction could be brought back
into employment without bidding up wages and materials prices.
Moreover, the market for existing houses was a buyers' market in most
areas and localities, and the large number of such houses offered for
sale at distress or near-distress prices served as a check on prices for
new dwellings. When the volume of new construction is limited by
materials and labor supply and a sellers' market prevails for existing
houses, as was the case from VJ-day to late in 1948, liberal credit is
likely to push up costs and prices rather than to increase production,
i.e., to be inflationary."
There may be some question whether the record after World War II
represents a fair test of the political and social difficulties that beset
a policy designed to bring greater stability to residential construction.
The test was complicated by the housing shortage and the problem of
providing housing for veterans. Nevertheless, it may be reasonable to
draw this much of an inference: the facts that housing has been in-
creasingly vested with public interest and that the volume of residential
building is subject to strong governmental influences do not of them-
selves assure greater stability. A real conflict may exist between the
social objective of economic stability and the social objective of maxi-
mum volume of housing construction when there is full employment
7LeoGrebler, "Stabilizing Residential Construction—A Review of the Postwar
Test," American Economic Review, September 1949, PP. 901-902. On the relation-
ship between credit terms and price levels see also Ernest M. Fisher, Urban Real
Estate Markets, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951, pp. 69-90, and the
same author's "The Role of Credit in the Real Estate Market," address before the
41st Annual Meeting of the American Life Convention in Chicago, October 7-11,
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and general pressure on resources. In such a situation "housing produc-
tion cannot be maximized without sacrifice of economic stability" and
"economic stability cannot be maintained without sacrifices of maxi-
mum housing construction."
On the other hand, the need for meshing the timing of federal
housing aids with general economic stabilization policies has been
increasingly recognized. The principle was embodied in the provision
of federal funds for urban redevelopment and of federal contributions
for public housing in 1949. The principle was put into practice after
the outbreak of the Korean hostilities when mortgage credit was
restricted by Regulation X and accompanying limitations on FHA-
insured and VA-guaranteed loans. It was expressed in the Housing
Amendments of 1953, which gave the President stand-by authority to
liberalize FHA maximum terms when "conditions in the home build-
ing industry and the general economy require it." Later, the Presi-
dent's Housing Message of January 25, 1954, extended the principle by
proposing executive authority to vary, within certain limitations, the
maximum terms for both FHA and VA mortgage loans. "This action by
the Congress," the message stated, "would materially strengthen our
ability to stabilize economic activity at high levels of production and
employment." While Congress failed to adopt the recommendation,
the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans' Administration
through regulation in July 1955 reduced the maximum maturity of
home mortgages insured or guaranteed under their programs from
thirty to twenty-five years and increased the requirements for minimum
downpayments by 2 per cent. These and other steps taken by govern-
ment agencies to cope with the exceedingly rapid increase of housing
credit on easy terms in late 1954 and early 1955 represented the first
peacetime effort to restrain home mortgage lending under federal pro-
grams, as part of a concerted credit policy designed to moderate the
exuberant economic expansion during 1955. In January 1956 the maxi-
mum maturity of FHA and VA home loans was restored to thirty
years.'°
8Grebler,"Stabilizing Residential Construction," as cited, p. 906.
Section 102(e) of the Housing Act of 1949 stipulates that the annual amount
of the federal notes and obligations authorized for loans to local public agencies
for urban redevelopment may be increased by specified amounts "upon a deter-
mination by the President, after receiving advice from the Council of Economic
Advisers as to the general effect of such increase upon the conditions in the build-
ing industry and upon the national economy, that such action is in the public
interest." Section 304 ( a) of the act contains identical language in regard to the
maximum amount of annual contributions which the Public Housing Authority is
authorized to contract with local housing authorities. Public Law 171, 91st Cong.
10EconomicReport of the President, January 1956.308 NOTE ON TIME PATTERN
It is fair to conclude that liberalized credit aids to housing will be
used, along with other measures, to soften any severe decline in
business activity. The recent actions seem to indicate that the reverse
use of these aids, for preventing overstimulation of demand when
production resources are fully utilized, has also come to be adopted
as a matter of practice as well as principle.
The transformation of principle into practical policy always requires
statesmanship in the face of social pressures and, more fundamentally,
a balancing by the community at large of reasonable expectations of
long-run benefits against apparent or real short-term advantages. The
solution of this problem will in large measure determine whether the
government's influence on residential construction will tend toward
greater stability in this important sector of the economy.